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Commercial Law--Great American Insurance Co. v. C. G. Tate
Construction Co.: Interpretation of Notice Provisions in
Insurance Contracts
Many insurance contracts require the insured to provide the insurance
company with timely notice of events giving rise to a claim.' These contracts
also usually require that the notice be given "immediately" 2 or "as soon as
practicable' 3 after the claim arises. Often the terms of the contracts are ex-
plicit in making compliance with these provisions a condition precedent to
recovery under the contract.4 The traditional approach to cases involving a
breach of this type of provision has been to read the contract literally and to
deny recovery if the requirements of the provision have not been met.5 North
Carolina courts and those in many other jurisdictions have denied recovery
based on this approach and upon the rule that when the terms of a contract are
clear and unambiguous, the courts may not alter the contract.6
A trend has been developing, however, that abandons the strict reading of
notice provisions in insurance contracts. 7 Courts are noting that these con-
tracts are not freely negotiated agreements but are actually contracts of adhe-
sion forced upon the insured by the insurer.3 This trend is part of a general
movement toward a view that insurance contracts should be interpreted conso-
nant with the purposes and intentions of both parties, instead of being read
strictly by the words of their provisions, which may be subject to more than
one interpretation. 9 The purpose and intention of an insurano- contract's no-
tice provision is to enable the insurer to begin its investigation and to initiate
other procedures as soon as possible after a claim arises, and to avoid any
prejudice that might be caused by a delay in receiving notice.10 Following this
1. See generally 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4731, at 10 (1981); Com-
ment, The Materialiy of Prejudice to the Insurer as a Result of the Insured's Failure to Give Timely
Notice, 74 DICK. L. REv. 260 (1970); Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 443 (1951).
2. Annot., supra note 2, § 14, at 462-64.
3. See, eg., Fleming v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 303, 134 S.E.2d 614 (1964);
Muncie v. Travelers Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 74, 116 S.E.2d 474 (1960).
4. 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 4732, at 10. Appleman notes that the result is often the
same in cases which the policy does not make compliance an explicit condition precedent because
courts often construe the notice provision as creating a condition precedent.
5. Id at 10-13.
6. Fleming v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 303, 134 S.E.2d (1964); Muncie v. Travel-
ers Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 74, 116 S.E.2d 474 (1960) ; Peeler v. United States Cas. Co., 197 N.C. 286,
148 S.E. 261 (1929).
7. Comment, supra note 1 at 261; Annot., supra note 1. See, e.g., Cooper v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66,
371 A.2d 193 (1977).
8. See, e-g., Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977). See infra notes
31-33 and accompanying text.
9. "As in other contracts, the objective of construction of terms in an insurance policy is to
arrive at the insurance coverage intended by the parties when the policy was issued." Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354, 172 S.E.2d 518, 522 (1970)
(construing a provision dealing with what types of accidents are covered).
10. 8 J. APPLEmAN, supra note 1, § 4731. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Milam,
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view, courts in numerous jurisdictions have held that even when the terms of a
notice provision have not been met, coverage by the insurer may not be
avoided unless the insurer shows prejudice from the delay."
In Great American Insurance Co. v. C. G. Tate Construction Co. 12 the
North Carolina courts joined the movement toward this more flexible ap-
proach. The supreme court in Tate explicitly overruled earlier precedent fol-
lowing the strict constructionist view.13 The court held that an insurer may
not deny coverage based on noncompliance with a notice provision unless the
insurer can prove that it has been prejudiced by the delay in receiving notice. 14
The dispute in Tate arose out of a collision between an automobile and a
tanker truck that occurred near a construction site where the C.G. Tate Con-
struction Company (Tate Construction) was working. The truck, driven by
Robert Allen Thomas and owned by State Petroleum, Inc., collided with an
automobile driven by Norma Jean Pegg. The law enforcement officer investi-
gating the accident received conflicting reports from witnesses concerning the
cause of the accident. Officials of Tate Construction testified that they did not
believe the company was involved, and thus did not report the accident to the
company's liability insurance carrier, Great American Insurance Co. It was
not until twenty-seven days after the accident that Great American first
learned of Tate Construction's potential liability. Subsequently, Great Ameri-
can initiated an action seeking a declaratory judgment relieving the insurance
company of any obligation to defend or indemnify Tate Construction in an
action arising out of the accident. The grounds for the action were Tate Con-
struction's failure to comply with the notice provision in the comprehensive
liability policy issued to Tate Construction by Great American, which re-
quired notification "as soon as practicable."'15 The trial court ruled that Great
American was released from its-duty under the policy because Tate Construc-
tion's failure to notify Great American "as soon as practicable" constituted a
failure of a condition precedent to coverage under the contract. 16
438 F. Supp. 227 (S.D.W. Va. 1977); Peeler v. United States Cas. Co., 192 N.C. 286, 148 S.E. 261
(1929).
11. See, eg., Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968);
Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977).
12. 303 N.C. 387, 279 S.E.2d 769 (1981).
13. The court explicitly overruled Fleming v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 303, 134
S.E.2d 614 (1964), Munice v. Travelers Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 74, 116 S.E.2d 474 (1960), and Peeler v.
United States Cas. Co., 197 N.C. 286, 148 S.E. 261 (1929). 303 N.C. at 396, 279 S.E.2d at 774.
14. 303 N.C. at 390, 279 S.E.2d at 771.
15. Id at 387, 279 S.E.2d at 770. The actual wording of the notice provision in the policy
issued to Tate Construction was:
4. Insured's duties in the event of occurrence, claim or suit:
(a) In the event of an occurrence, written notice containing particulars sufficient to
identify the insured and also reasonably obtainable information with respect to the
time, place and circumstances thereof, and the names and addresses of the injured
and of available witnesses, shall be given by or for the insured to the company or any
of its authorized agents as soon as practicable.
Great American Ins. Co. v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 46 N.C. App. 427, 432, 265 S.E.2d 467, 470
(1980), at'd, 303 N.C. 387, 279 S.E.2d 769 (1981).
16. 303 N.C. at 389-90, 279 S.E.2d at 771.
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On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed and ruled that
the insurance company must also show prejudice in order to deny recovery
based on noncompliance with a notice provision. 17 The court of appeals dis-
tinguished the case from earlier precedent applying the strict constructionist
view, noting that in Tate the insured party had given an excuse for not com-
plying with the notice provision. The court went on to say that when an ex-
cuse is given, the question whether notice was given "as soon as practicable"
becomes a quesiton of fact, and that the existence of prejudice to the insurer is
the key factor to be considered in answering the question. 18 The case was
remanded to the trial level for a finding on whether Great American had been
prejudiced by the twenty-seven day delay. 19
The supreme court, with one justice dissenting,20 affirmed the appellate
court's holding but modified the decision and based the ruling on a substan-
tially different rationale. Since it possessed the authority to overrule its earlier
precedent-a power the court of appeals lacked-the supreme court did not
find it necessary to distinguish the Tate case based on the existence of an ex-
cuse.21 The high court explicitly overruled prior cases that had followed the
strict constructionist approach2 2 and held that "failure of an insured to notify
its insurer of an accident 'as soon as practicable' does not relieve the insurer of
its obligations under the contract unless the delay operates materially to
prejudice the ability of the insurer to investigate and defend." 23 The burden
of proving prejudice is on the insurer once the insured is found to have acted
in good faith.24
17. 46 N.C. App. at 427, 265 S.E.2d at 467. For a more complete discussion of the opinion in
the court of appeals, modified by the supreme court, see Note, Insurance-A New Approachfor the
Interpretation of Insurance Contracts, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 141 (1981).
18. 46 N.C. App. at 434-35, 265 S.E.2d at 472.
19. Id at 438, 265 S.E.2d at 474. The North Carolina Supreme Court initially denied Great
American's petition for discretionary review, but eventually granted a reconsideration of this de-
nial and granted review. 301 N.C. 401, 273 S.E.2d 446 (1980).
20. Justice Meyer dissented from the majority opinion in this case on almost all points. He
argued strenuously for the strict constructionist view, noting his belief that this view is still held by
the majority of jurisdictions. 303 N.C. at 401-02, 279 S.E. 2d at 777-78 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Meyer's primary authority for'this assertion is a 1970 comment from the DICKINSON LAW
REVIEW, see Comment, supra note I. A great number of jurisdictions have changed or at least
modified their positions since 1970. See Annot., supra note 1. Appleman, on the other hand,
indicates that the new approach adopted in Tate is still a minority view. 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra
note 1, § 4732.
Justice Meyer also stated that even if he agreed with the result in Tate, he would not state the
rule so broadly. He did not believe the burden of proving prejudice should be on the insurer, 303
N.C. at 404, 279 S.E.2d at 779, nor did he agree with the majority that the new rule protects the
insurance company's interests. Id at 405-06, 279 S.E.2d at 780. Justice Meyer argued that the
case could be decided without overruling precedent by recognizing an exception when the insured
does not believe he is liable for the accident. Id at 406-07, 279 S.E.2d at 780-81. Finally, the
dissenting justice did not believe that Tate's actions had been in "good faith," as required by the
majority opinion. Id at 407, 279 S.E.2d at 781.
21. The supreme court pointed out that an attempt to distinguish Tate on its facts did not
square with the rationale of the earlier cases. These cases unwaveringly applied the strict construc-
tionist approach and left no room for exceptions. Id at 392-93, 279 S.E.2d at 772.
22. See supra note 13.
23. 303 N.C. at 396, 279 S.E.2d at 774.
24. Id at 399, 279 S.E.2d at 776.
1982]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Prior to Tate, North Carolina traditionally had been in line with most
other jurisdictions in applying a strict constructionist approach to the interpre-
tation of insurance contracts. 25 Under this approach, the courts'have held that
insurance contracts must be enforced as written and have refused to "rewrite"
contracts for the parties.26 The basis for this rule is that although the intent of
the parties is to be the guiding factor in interpreting insurance contracts, clear
and unambiguous language, when present, must be the source used for finding
this intent.27 This position represents a straightforward application of general
contract law principles to insurance policies.28
Courts have established various doctrines reflecting the recognition that
insurance contracts are often not ordinary contracts, and thus should not al-
ways be governed by ordinary contract rules. 29 Courts have often noted that
insurance contracts usually are not negotiated freely, but are presented by the
insurance company on a "take-it-or-leave-it basis."'30 As such, policies are
often contracts of adhesion, requiring the court to make special inquiries into
their fairness and whether they represent the true intentions and expectations
of both parties.31 Further, since insurance contracts are prepared by the insur-
ance company, all doubts and ambiguities must be construed in favor of the
insured.32
In spite of this trend toward a more liberal construction of insurance con-
tracts in general, North Carolina courts had, before Tate, applied the strict
constructionist approach in cases dealing with notice provisions.3 3 In cases
involving a requirement that notice be given as soon as practicable or within a
reasonable time, the courts had held that this determination must be made on
the basis of the facts and surrounding circumstances.34 If a determination
were made that notice was not given in compliance with the terms of the pol-
icy, the old approach was to deny coverage to the insured based on the failure
of a condition precedent to the contract.
A pioneering case in the movement toward the adoption of a more liberal
view of notice provisions was the 1968 New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in
25. See, eg., Rose Hill Poultry Corp. v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 34 N.C. App. 224, 237
S.E.2d 564 (1977).
26. See, e.g., York Indus. Center, Inc. v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co., 271 N.C. 158, 155 S.E.2d
501 (1967); Richardson v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 254 N.C. 711, 119 S.E.2d 871 (1961); Ford v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 222 N.C. 154, 22 S.E.2d 235 (1942).
27. Duke v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 286 N.C. 244, 210 S.E.2d 187 (1974).
28. 4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COTRACrs §§ 601, 609, at 306-09, 402 (3d
ed. 1961); 17 AM. JUR. 2D CONTRACTS § 242 (1964).
29. Comment, supra note 1, at 261.
30. See, e.g., Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968). See
also 7 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 900 (3d ed. 1973).
31. Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977).
32. Barker v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 241 N.C. 397, 85 S.E.2d 305 (1955); Cherokee Ins. Co. v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 46 N.C. App. 242, 264 S.E.2d 913 (1980).
33. Fleming v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 303, 134 S.E.2d 614 (1964); Muncie v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 74, 116 S.E.2d 474 (1960).
34. See, eg., Harris v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 499, 135 S.E.2d 209 (1964). See
also 7 J. STRONo, N.C. INDEX INSURANCE § 96.1, at 511-12 (3d ed. 1976).
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Cooper v. Government Employees Insurance Co.3 5 In the face of a contract
provision stating that notification of the insurer "as soon as practicable" was a
"condition precedent" to coverage,3 6 the court held that coverage could be
avoided only by "a breach of the notice provision and a likelihood of appreci-
able prejudice." 37 Courts in numerous jurisdictions, and the legislature of at
least one state,38 followed the trend initiated in Cooper, often with slight varia-
tions as to the exact standard for denying coverage. 39 Despite these variations,
almost all of the decisions have been based on the adhesion contract rationale.
Noting that contracts of adhesion are to be read liberally with emphasis on the
purposes and intention of the contract, these courts have found that the pre-
vention of investigative and defense problems for insurance carriers is the
principal purpose of notice provisions. Thus, these provisions should not be
used to deny coverage unless the insurance company has been prejudiced in its
ability to investigate and defend. Notwithstanding these arguments, however,
the North Carolina courts had continued to follow the strict constructionist
approach when dealing with notice provisions.
4 °
The supreme court's decision in Tate represents a major shift in the North
Carolina approach to notice provisions and relieves North Carolina tribunals
from the necessity of distinguishing earlier precedent in order to avoid harsh
results. 4 1 The court in Tate adopted a three-part test for determining whether
the insurer is obligated under the policy:
When faced with a claim that notice was not timely given, the trier of
fact must first decide whether the notice was given as soon as practi-
cable. If not, the trier of fact must decide whether the insured has
shown that he acted in good faith, e.g., that he had no actual knowl-
edge that a claim might be filed against him. If the good faith test is
met the burden then shifts to the insurer to show that its ability to
investigate and defend was materially prejudiced by the delay.4 2
This three-step test, with its explicit inclusion of a good faith requirement, is
stated in a form different from the standards in most jurisdictions adopting the
35. 51 NJ. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968).
36. Id at 88-90, 237 A.2d at 871-72.
37. Id at 94, 237 A.2d at 874.
38. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 482 (1979) provides:
Where any insurer seeks to disclaim coverage on any policy of liability insurance
issued by it, on the ground that the insured or anyone claiming the benefits of the policy
through the insured has breached the policy by failing to cooperate with the insurer or by
not giving requisite notice to the insurer, .such disclaimer shall be effective only if the
insurer establishes by a preponderance of affirmative evidence that such lack of coopera-
tion or notice has resulted in actual prejudice to the insurer.
39. See, eg., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Milam, 438 F. Supp. 227 (S.D.W. Va. 1977);
Globe Indem. Co. v. Blomfield, 115 Ariz. 5, 562 P.2d 1372 (1977); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Johnson, 320 A.2d 345 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); Fakouri v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 378 So. 2d
1083 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Bowes, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1831, 409 N.E.2d
185 (1980); Finstad v. Steiger Tractor, Inc., 301 N.W.2d 392 (N.D 1981); Brakeman v. Potomac
Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977) ; Dietz v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 88 Wis.
2d 496, 276 N.W.2d 808 (1979).
40. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
41. See supra note 20-21 and accompanying text
42. 303 N.C. at 399, 279 S.E.2d at 776.
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new approach, 43 but its effect is probably similar. The North Carolina court
relied heavily on the Cooper decision, which had adopted a two-step approach
that required proof of both noncompliance with the notice provision and the
likelihood of prejudice.44 The Cooper court made it clear, however, that good
faith was a significant factor in the determination of compliance with the no-
tice provision.45 Thus, it seems unlikely that the additional good faith require-
ment in the North Carolina analysis will significantly alter the doctrine from
the way it has been applied in other states.
It might be argued that the good faith requirement is a return to the court
of appeals' ruling that prejudice must be shown only in cases in which the
insured has an excuse for the delay.46 The court specifically rejected the court
of appeals' analysis, however, and ruled that the existence or nonexistence of
an explanation for the delayed notice is not controlling.47 The court imposed
the good faith requirement merely to ensure that the decision would not "be
perceived as encouraging dilatory tactics in the notification of the insurer." 48
The good faith requirement does not necessitate any excuse for the delayed
notification, only that the insured "had no actual knowledge that a claim
would be filed against him." 49 It is significant that the court used the words
"actual knowledge." This language makes it clear that if the insured merely
should have known that a claim had been filed against him (in other words, he
had no valid excuse for not notifying the insurer), but he had no actual knowl-
edge of the claim, he still would be deemed to have acted in good faith.
Under the test adopted in Tate, the insurer carries the burden of proving
prejudice once good faith and noncompliance with the notice provision have
been established.5 0 Although the North Carolina court correctly noted that
the cases are split on this issue,5 1 the Tate decision seems consistent with the
trend in the more recent decisions in placing the burden on the insurer.
5 2
The court offered persuasive reasons why the insurance company should
43. The explicit inclusion of the good faith requirement is apparently unique; other jurisdic-
tions imply that good faith of the insured is an important consideration. See infra note 47 and
accompanying text. Other slight variations in language also exist. For example, North Carolina
uses "material prejudice," while New Jersey uses "appreciable prejudice." These differences,
however, seem insignificant since the cases are generally based on the same rationale. See supra
note 39 & infra notes 70-72, and accompanying text.
44. 51 N.J. at 94, 237 A.2d at 874.
45. Id
46. See saupra note 18 and accompanying text.
47. 303 N.C. at 392, 279 S.E.2d at 772.
48. Id at 399, 279 S.E.2d at 776.
49. Id
50. Id
51. Id at 397, 279 S.E.2d at 775.
52. See, e.g., Gladstone v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 1403 (2d Cir. 1976); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Milam; 438 F.Supp. 227 (S.D.W. Va. 1977); Globe Indem. Co. v. Blomfield,
115 Ariz. 5, 562 P.2d 1372 (1977); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 320 A.2d 345 (Del.
1974); O'Neal v. Southern Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 325 So. 2d 887 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Johnson
Controls, Inc. v. Bowes, 180 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1831, 409 N.E.2d 185 (1980); Cooper v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968); Finstad v. Steiger Tractor, Inc., 301 N.W.2d
392 (N.D. 1981); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977); Sivaro v. Great
Am. Ins. Co., 410 A.2d 116 (R.I. 1980).
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carry the burden of proving prejudice. First, to do so will encourage the in-
surer to make a prompt investigation when it learns of the claim. Second, the
insurer is in the best position to evaluate its ability to defend. Third, it would
be difficult for the insured to prove a negative (lack of prejudice) if he is given
the burden of proof.5 3 The argument also has been made that the insurer
should bear the burden of proof since it is trying to bring about a forfeiture of
the very essence of the contract-protection of the insured.5 4 On the other
hand, some commentators and courts have argued that the insured should
bear the burden of proof since he is the party trying to escape from the specific
contract provision of notice.55 Nevertheless, the practical considerations enu-
merated by North Carolina courts appear .to have won out in most states.5 6
The major question left unanswered by the Tate holding is how the
prejudice requirement will be interpreted and applied in future cases. Non-
compliance with the notice provision will not relieve the insurance company's
obligation unless the company proves that "the delay operates materially to
prejudice the insurer's ability to investigate and defend,"57 but it is unclear
how much prejudice is "material." The existence of material prejudice will be
based on the facts of each case, and thus the court conceded that it could not
enunciate an exacting test.58 Therefore, a major source for indications of how
the prejudice standard will be applied in North Carolina may be the decisions
of other jurisdictions that have adopted and interpreted similar rules.
Courts in other jurisdictions generally have been strict in requiring an
affirmative showing of prejudice.59 It is not enough for an insurance company
to show an inability to follow its regular procedures for making an investiga-
53. 303 N.C. at 398, 279 S.E.2d at 775-76. The Cooper court noted, however, that the insured
party is still under an obligation to produce any evidence within its possession that might impinge
on the question of prejudice. 51 N.J. at 94 n.3, 237 A.2d at 874 n.3.
54. 303 N.C. at 39, 279 S.E.2d at 775.
55. This argument is made by Justice Meyer in his dissent. Id at 404, 279 S.E.2d at 779
(Meyer, J., dissenting). See also, Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Cunningham, 360 F. Supp. 139 (D. Colo.
1973); Tiedke v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 222 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1969); 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1
§ 4732, at 26-30:
Since it is often impossible for the insurer to know what witnesses it would have found or
what facts it could have ascertained had immediate notice been given and a prompt
investigation made, it is submitted that this test (placing burden on insurer to prove
prejudice) is unworkable. The burden should be placed on the one seeking to recover.
56. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
57. 303 N.C. at 390, 279 S.E.2d at 771.
58. Id at 399, 279 S.E.2d at 776. The court did adopt the court of appeals' list of factors to be
considered in determining whether the insurer has been prejudiced: the availability of witnesses
to the accident; the ability to discover other information regarding the conditions of the locale
where the accident occurred; any physical changes in the location of the accident during the pe-
riod of the delay; the existence of official reports concerning the occurrence; the preparation and
preservation of demonstrative and illustrative evidence, such as vehicles involved in the occur-
rence, or photographs and diagrams of the scene; the ability of experts to reconstruct the scene and
the occurrence. Id at 398, 279 S.E.2d at 776 (citing 46 N.C. App. at 437, 265 S.E.2d at 473). The
court, however, went on to say that this list is merely illustrative, and that "[a] more complete
discussion of the prejudicial factors will have to await a case-by-case development." Id at 399,
279 S.E.2d at 776.
59. It has often been said that the "mere speculation" or "mere possibility" of prejudice is not
enough. See, e.g., Moe v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 21 Cal. App. 289, 98 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1971);
Falcon Steel Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 366 A.2d 512 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976).
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tion.60 The insurer must show affirmatively that it has lost an opportunity
which would have made a difference in the settlement of the claim or in de-
fense of the lawsuit.6 ' Thus, courts have often stretched to avoid denying cov-
erage under the proof of prejudice requirement. In Colonial Gas Energy
System v. Unigard Mutual Insurance Co. 62 the owner of insured liquid natural
gas tanks repaired the damaged tanks before filing a claim. The insurance
company could no longer investigate due to the insured's actions, and
prejudice was thus found. The court deferred judgment, however, because the
insured stated that the insurer could now inspect the tanks, although this
would cost the insurer $100,000 to $200,000 (the claim being for $3,257,035).
The court found that this inspection might remove any prejudice suffered by
the insurance company. 63 When significant and irreparable prejudice has
clearly been shown, however, courts have held that the insurer has met its
burden.64
The New Jersey courts, which pioneered the new approach with Cooper,
elaborated on their test for proving prejudice in Morales v. National Grange
Mutual Insurance Co. 65 In that decision two variables were identified as cen-
tral to the resolution of the question of prejudice. The first is whether "sub-
stantial rights pertaining to a defense against the claim have been irretrievaboy
lost."'66 The court pointed out that in some cases prejudice clearly will exist,
but if the prejudicial effects of the delay can be removed, it would be unfair to
deny coverage. 67
The second variable identified in Morales is "the likelihood of success of
the insurer in defending against the accident victim's claim." s68 The court
noted that in cases in which the liability of the insured and proof of damages
are clear, it would be unfair to deny coverage based on noncompliance with a
notice requirement.69 In such a case, prejudice to the insurer's ability to inves-
tigate and defend would not make any difference, since it is clear that the
insured would be held liable in any event.
60. Falcon Steel Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 366 A.2d 512 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976).
61. Id at 518.
62. 441 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
63. Id
64. See, eg., Lumbermans Mut. Casualty Co. v. Oliver, 151 N.H. 141, 335 A.2d 666 (1975)
(one year delay held prejudicial when it was impossible to locate any witnesses or ascertain cause
of the accident). See also National Bank v. Winstead Excavating, 94 Ill. App. 3d 839, 419 N.E.2d
522 (1981).
65. 176 N.J. Super. 347, 423 A.2d 325 (Law Div. 1980).
66. Id at 355, 423 A.2d at 329 (emphasis in original).
67. Id at 355-56 , 423 A.2d at 329-30. See also supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
68. 176 N.J. Super. at 356, 423 A.2d at 330.
69. Id The courts of Maryland, in applying that state's statute requiring, proof of prejudice,
see supra note 38, have ruled that the insurer must establish a "substantial likelihood that if the
cooperation or notice clause had not been breached, the insured would not have been held liable."
Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Rosenbaum, 30 Md. App. 74, - , 351 A.2d 197, 202 (1976). The court
went on to say that "a finding of actual prejudice inherently depends to some extent upon the
closeness of the case." Id Accord Northwestern Title Sec. Co. v. Flack, 6 Cal. App. 3d 134, 85
Cal. Rptr. 693. (1970).
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Courts in most cases appear to hold that mere monetary prejudice to the
insurer is not a sufficient reason for denying coverage.70 This position is very
much in line with the Tate test, which requires a showing of prejudice to "the
insurer's ability to investigate and defend,"' 71 not to the insurer's
pocketbook.72
The courts of other states also have held that when an insurer has been
prevented from making its own investigation, it will be required to accept the
investigation of a third party if the insurer cannot show any reason why its
own investigation would have been better.73 Further, it has been almost uni-
versally held that where the insurer received actual notice of an accident
within a reasonable time, it cannot claim prejudice simply because it did not
receive noticefrom the insured until much later.74 These cases are further evi-
dence of the strong desire in jurisdictions following the more liberal approach
to disfavor a forfeiture of coverage whenever possible.
With the Tate decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court has avoided
the harsh results that often are caused by the inflexible application of strict
legal principles. The court has shown a willingness to read insurance contracts
more in line with the purposes of the contract, with less reliance on the techni-
cal language drafted by the party having most of the bargaining power. Some
might argue that placing the burden on the insurance company to prove
prejudice is an undue hardship, especially since the entire problem has been
caused by the insured's delay. Nevertheless, the imposition of the good faith
requirement by the North Carolina court is a reminder that the interests of the
insurance company still must be balanced against those of the insured.75 As
the Cooper court noted, "This is not to belittle the need for notice of the acci-
dent, but rather to put the subject in perspective."' 76 The Tate decision and the
70. See, e.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Ins. Cos., 307 Minn. 338, 239 N.W.2d 922 (1976)
(no prejudice from showing that the delay merely caused a greater accumulation of interest);
Abington Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Drew, 109 N.H. 464, 254 A.2d 829 (1969) (mere possibility that
insurance company could have negotiated a cheaper settlement but for the delay does not require
finding of prejudice).
71. 303 N.C. at 390, 279 S.E.2d at 771.
72. There are some cases from California, however, which at least hint that financial
prejudice might be taken into consideration. See, eg., Northwestern Title Sec. Co. v. Flack, 6
Cal. App. 3d 134, 85 Cal. Rptr. 693 (may find prejudice if insurer can show it could have settled
for smaller amount with proper notification). See also Billington v. Interinsurance Exch., 71 Cal.
2d 728, 456 P.2d 982, 79 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1969).
73. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Petzold, 418 F.2d 303 (Ist Cir. 1969); Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 63 Wis. 2d 148, 216 N.W.2d 205 (1974); Falcon Steel Co. v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 366 A.2d 512 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976).
74. See, ag., Helay Tibbitts Constr. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 482 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Cal.
1979); Hood v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 412 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. Miss. 1976); Arizona Title Ins. &
Trust Co. v. Pace, 8 Ariz. App. 269, 445 P.2d 471 (1968); LaPointe v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 361
Mass. 558, 281 N.E.2d 253 (1972); Kolbeck v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Wis. 2d 655, 235 N.W.2d
466 (1975).
75. Justice Meyer argued vigorously in his dissent that the Tate rule doe-s not adequately
protect the interests of both parties. He argued that under the new rule only the expectations of
the insured are adequately considered and that the insurer has not been protected from 'Yraud and
imposftion." 303 N.C. at 405-06, 279 S.E.2d at 780 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
76. 51 N.J. at 94, 237 A.2d at 873.
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probable application of its doctrine appear to have struck a favorable balance
between the interests of both parties in the resolution of this type of insurance
contract dispute.77
HENRY HAMILTON RALSTON
77. As the Tale court indicated, "The rule we adopt today has the advantages of promoting
social policy and fulfilling the reasonable expectations of the purchaser while fully protecting the
ability of the insurer to protect its own interests." 303 N.C. at 395, 279 S.E.2d at 774.
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